Iran contra affair what was the outcome

Despite the fact that Reagan defended the actions by virtue of their good intentions, his honesty was doubted. Polls showed that only 14 percent of Americans believed the president when he said he had not traded arms for hostages. Then-unknown Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council explained the discrepancy: he had been diverting funds from the arms sales to the Contras, with the full knowledge of National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and with the unspoken blessing, he assumed, of President Reagan.

Poindexter resigned, and North was fired, but Iran-Contra was far from over. The press hounded the president: Did he know about these illegal activities, and if not, how could something of this magnitude occur without his knowledge? In an investigation by the Reagan-appointed Tower Commission, it was determined that, as president, Reagan's disengagement from the management of his White House had created conditions which made possible the diversion of funds to the Contras.

But there was no evidence linking Reagan to the diversion. Speculation about the involvement of Reagan, Vice President George Bush and the administration at large ran rampant. Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh investigated the affair for the next eight years. Fourteen people were charged with either operational or "cover-up" crimes. In the end, North's conviction was overturned on a technicality, and President Bush issued six pardons, including one to McFarlane, who had already been convicted, and one to Weinberger before he stood trial.

Although laws had been broken, and Reagan's image suffered as a result of Iran-Contra, his popularity rebounded. In he left office with the highest approval rating of any president since Franklin Roosevelt.

Discover the fascinating story of Elizebeth Smith Friedman, the groundbreaking cryptanalyst who helped bring down gangsters and break up a Nazi spy ring in South America. As I understand it, there was nothing in his notes that would add anything to the mix in terms of who knew what. There was not anything material in his notes. At some point, I was asked whether I knew whether Weinberger had any notes. But I was surprised by the Weinberger indictment—and more so by its timing. I was not surprised by the pardons.

Miller Center: Were they trying to turn somebody way up top? What was that about, in your view? Culvahouse: Frustration. Judge Walsh shifted course two or three times. He had that interview with President Reagan where he wanted to come in and interview the President when everyone had told him that the President was no longer there mentally.

I understand they wanted to go back and look at the diary and make sure that all the diary excerpts had been produced by us. A lot of the mature adults—experienced prosecutors who were working for him—left, and the quality and experience level, and the nonpartisanship of his staff, changed over time.

It went from well-respected former prosecutors and major law firm partners, people who did not have any identifiable political affiliation or bias and were respected members of the Bar, and became staffed by people who were either partisan or less experienced.

Max Friedersdorf Assistant to the President and Legislative Strategy Coordinator : I think [Iran-Contra] was another case of overzealousness, would be my interpretation of it. The administration was so anxious to help the Contras and to help them regain their country and defeat the Sandinistas that we were trying to figure out ways to get around—Congress would not appropriate any money for us to give them aid; they blocked it through amendments.

We can do a third-country transfer. I thought it was pretty bright myself, to be honest with you. But there are different interpretations that we did violate the law. I think the President probably was not tuned in to the details on it. I think [John] Poindexter and Bud McFarland and Ollie North ran the operation and the President was just probably aware—he was very pro Contra, of course—that he was telling them get it done and spare me the details.

But there was so much heat from the Hill that about anything you did to help them was going to be controversial. James F. We know what the President did. In his way, he approved the arms sales to Iran, but in his mind that was justified because we had a way of dealing with moderates there in opening up Iran and trying to make headway in that area of the world with the Middle East. So he thought it was a step in the right direction.

But at the same time he was driven by getting the hostages back. This was an opening with Iran, in dealing with a new element there and possible new leadership. If we got the hostages back because of it, then so be it. If it made more inroads with Iran, so be it.

However, Reagan had absolutely no idea that from the arms sales, that money was being diverted to Central America, to the Contras. He had absolutely no idea. He was stunned when he found out. They had come into the second administration, and they had no idea how he thought or how he worked. Reagan tends to trust people who work for him.

Some people have their own best interests at heart. But all those people were gone. Frederick J. Ryan assistant to the President of the United States : The first request from independent counsel was to have Ronald Reagan come back to Washington.

They wanted to do the whole thing at the courthouse. He is now Solicitor General. Ted Olson and I and others felt that that was neither the right venue nor the right scene for a former President to testify in Federal court. An arrangement was made—actually, this came up two times. Once was the Poindexter trial, and once was when independent counsel wanted to depose President Reagan.

At the Poindexter trial an agreement was made. President Reagan sat down the day before with Ted Olson and talked about the facts. You are a witness in the trial. It was not a lawyer-like deposition. Unfortunately, it was taped, and the tape was played over and over again. It was hours long. They showed him photos and documents. I think it was out of context and after asking a lot of detailed questions about Contras and things like that.

There was a second one where they wanted him to come back to Washington and the independent counsel again wanted him to come to the Federal courthouse.

It would be an interview with a court reporter there. The funny thing was that the independent counsel came out. Ryan: Walsh came out first, and they had a lot of negotiations about where it would take place and who could be in the room because of all the security issues involved.

It was finally agreed that President Reagan would be there. Ted Olson, his counsel, and I would be there as a lawyer. My clearance was still in place. Then he would have some people on his side. They sent people out to look at the room. The security people came in and did the windows so no photos could be taken in of the confidential documents, and they swept it for devices.

They came in and sat down with President Reagan. They were from one person to another at the State Department or elsewhere. Peter Wallison White House counsel : My theory was that this is not something you want to cover up.

So what? Maybe you made some kind of bonehead play here. Who cares? And, as an aside, the arms deal would secure funds that the CIA could secretly funnel to the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua. Three of the seven hostages in Lebanon were also released, although the Iran-backed terrorist group there later took three more Americans hostage.

Reagan initially denied that he had negotiated with Iran or the terrorists, only to retract the statement a week later. It was then that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North , of the National Security Council, came forward to acknowledge that he had diverted the missing funds to the Contras in Nicaragua, who used them to acquire weapons.

He assumed Reagan was also aware of his efforts. The American press hounded Reagan over the matter for the rest of his presidency. During a subsequent Congressional investigation, in , protagonists in the scandal—including Reagan—testified before the commission in hearings that were televised nationally. Later, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh launched an eight-year investigation into what by then had become known as the Iran-Contra Affair.

In all, 14 people were charged, including North, Poindexter and McFarlane. Reagan himself was never charged, and, in , George H. McFarlane was charged with four counts of withholding information from Congress, a misdemeanor. North was charged with 12 counts relating to conspiracy and making false statements. Although he was convicted in his initial trial, the case was dismissed on appeal, due to a technicality, and North has since worked as a conservative author, critic, television host and head of the NRA.

Poindexter was initially indicted on seven felonies and ultimately tried on five. He was found guilty on four of the charges and sentenced to two years in prison, although his convictions were later vacated. In addition, four CIA officers and five government contractors were also prosecuted; although all were found guilty of charges ranging from conspiracy to perjury to fraud, only one—private contractor Thomas Clines—ultimately served time in prison.

Despite the fact that Reagan had promised voters he would never negotiate with terrorists—which he or his underlings did while brokering the weapons sales with Iran—the two-term occupant of the White House left office as a popular president.

However, his legacy, at least among his supporters, remains intact—and the Iran-Contra Affair has been relegated to an often-overlooked chapter in U. The Iran-Contra Affair— The Washington Post. The Iran-Contra Affairs.